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Open letter to Hodari Abdul Ali

Tears of Blood Oil

Libyan leader reveals outcomes of his encounters with African leaders

The falling Elephant

POST-CONFLICT SUDAN CONFERENCE

Memo to the Arab League

Declearation of Jihad war against Africa

Soon coming

Sudan: The Falling Elephant
Public Lecture
Villanova University
School of Arab and Islamic Studies
May 17, 2001
Steven Wondu


Quiz
Which of the following objects resembles an elephant?
(a) Tree
(b) Wall
(c) Rug
(d) None of the above
(e) All the above
Answer
refers to the leg
refers to the side
refers to the ear
each of above is right
e. correct answer

The Sudan is like an elephant. Your appreciation of it depends, literally and figuratively, on where you are coming from. Depending on the context, Sudan is in North Africa, East Africa, or Central Africa. Its nearest neighbor is Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo, Central Africa Republic or Chad. Sudan is in the Sahara desert, in the Savannah belt, in the Sudd of the Upper Nile and in the Equatorial forest of the Nile-Congo drainage divide.

A Sudanese can be white, black, blue, or brown depending on which tne of the thirty four million of them you are looking at. Sudanese are Arabs or Africans, Muslims or Christians or none of the above. All countries have a north-south reference line. In Sudan, this otherwise benign compass designation is the critical fault line of conflict. It describes the political, racial and religious cleavage responsible for millions of deaths and displacement.

The elephantine physique of Sudan is reflected in the way its current conflict is explained. Islamic fundamentalists see it as a valid jihad or divine mission. The none-Muslims see the same thing as religious persecution. Northerners see the conflict as a legacy of British imperialism. The list of perceptions is long, including racial hegemony,political domination, economic exploitation, slavery, foreign conspiracy or all of the above.

There is a sadly comic denial of the validity of some of these factors.It is argued, for example, that there cannot be a racial conflict in Sudan because the vast majority of the citizens are of Negroid African stock. The reality in Sudan is that Arabism is not a genetic phenomenon but a cultural acquisition. In Sudan, Islam and Arab culture are indistinguishably intertwined.

The British are often blamed for sawing the seed of discord during their fifty years of colonial rule [1898 to 1955]. But the Sudanese have had almost as many years of independence in which to root out the Britannic weed and nurture a Sudannic crop.

You must have heard Khartoums argument that there is no religious or racial discrimination, much less persecution, because there are non-Muslims and black Africans holding senior positions in government. The truth is that Southerners historically receive token public offices devoid of content and without effect on the destiny of society in general. Dr. Lam Akol, Beshirs Minister of Transport recently found his
mouth and asked why certain ministries go to southerners while 0thers are beyond their reach. Akol’s portfolio does not include road transport and aviation.

The emergence of armed resistance in the north has lent greater weight to the notion that Sudanese of different races, religions, ethnicity and region, are waging the war against a regime composed of Sudanese from equally diverse backgrounds. These two schools lead to the conclusion that the Sudan in entangled in an ideological conflict between those in favor of a repressive Islamic system of governance and another group that prefers a secular democracy. The national Democratic Alliance (NDA)is the nearest political formation of national character. It is the acid
test of whether northerners and southerners can work as equals in the interest of the country.

These fine treatises of the Sudanese crisis effectively hide the core of the problem and frustrate the search for peace. We cannot determine the solution to a problem whose cause we cannot accurately identify. This mass of mess must have a nucleus. There has to be an epicenter for the Sudanese volcano.

The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, which I am honored to represent, has pleaded for the conversion of Sudans diversity into an elephantine strength, by crafting one democratic multi-racial state out of that one million square miles of land mass, equivalent to the United States east of the Mississippi river. Intuitively, there can be no antithesis to such a proposition. But that has not resolved the question of whether such an ideal is feasible. A young Sudanese-American scientist is of the view that the SPLM notion of a new Sudan based on equality would be possible if the proposition originated from the north. According to him, charity cannot emanate from the poor. Benevolence cannot originate from the weak. The villain cannot exercise forgiveness. For the one-just-united Sudan to be realized, the initiative must originate, not from the oppressed African, non-Muslim South; but from the ruling elite of the North. The South African case is a relevant example. In the Sudanese experience, the 1972 agreement was possible thanks to then-president Numeiris temporary charity and benevolence. The south was able to forgive. The betrayal of their trust led the South to launch the current struggle in 1983.

In the numerous peace conferences between the SPLM and the
northern-dominated governments of Sudan, three key disagreements stand out prominently.

Identity
While both sides agree that the country is multi-ethnic and
multi-cultural, The government insists, to this day, that the Islamic/Arab dimension of the country must have a definitive status in the state and accommodation has to be found for the others in the interim period until total assimilation is achieved.

Islamic State
Despite the recognition of the multiplicity of Sudanese culture, the government insists that the constitution of the country be based on the tenets of fundamentalist Islam. This has profound implications on a wide range of issues in the public domain. It means non-Muslims and women would have no access to high public office in the executive and judicial branches of government. It means amputation of limbs for petty theft. It means public flogging for use of alcohol. It legitimizes enslavement of
non-Muslims. It provides for stoning offenders to death for sexually related offenses. Islamic jurisprudence is full of discriminatory
provisions cover-to-cover. Islamic clerics can say much about the
spiritual and even social advantages of these laws. Our argument is that what is good for the ardent Muslim is not necessarily good for everybody else. In any case, we believe that the state has no responsibility beyond the secular welfare of society.

Wealth
If you attempted a trek through Sudan, you could come out disgusted and wondering why any rational person could want to live there, leave alone fight for it. You would see endless expanse of arid terrain. Then you would encounter bogs and swamps full of mosquitoes. You might not see running water or electricity for hundreds of miles. You would see elephants all right.

The Sudan is not developed, but it is rich in natural resources. One of the causes of the war is the expropriation and plunder of our natural heritage. In the earlier phases of the exploitation, invaders were content with human slaves and game trophies like ivory. Then as irrigation technology arrived in the Nile basin, water became the main magnet of neocolonialism in the Sudan. Today, oil has erupted and joined the treasured slaves, water and pasture to fuel the economic war in Sudan.

So when you hear the Sudanese government talk about the unity of the country, they mean a territorially united Sudan that essentially retains Arabism and Islamism as the definitive characteristics of its identity. They mean that the status quo should be retained because the war is good for business. They see the South as a backyard or a real estate for their pleasure, entertainment, hunting safaris, and exploitation. their press accurately portrays Khartoums designs when it passionately
appeals for wahida al arad al Sudan [unity of the lands of Sudan]. There is no sensitivity to the rights and needs of the human inhabitants of the lands. Our very existence is conveniently assumed away.

The armed struggle then is a last resort to convince the rulers of Sudan that they do not wholly own the elephant they are riding. It emphasizes the resolve that we cannot tolerate the beast trotting on us with impunity. Many observers are persuaded by Khartoum’s assertion that with oil revenue lubricating their war machine, outright victory over the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army is inevitable. Nobody can underestimate the critical role of physical inputs is warfare, but it takes a lot more than instruments to win a war.There are also some intangible assets
whose effect could well invert the entire equation. In Sudan these elements include domestic political dynamics and how they blend into the broader scene in Africa and the rest of the world.

The need for a negotiated settlement has never been more urgent than is now. Unfortunately, the parties see peace from diametrically opposite perspectives. The regime is seeking for settlement that leaves their system intact with some temporary cosmetic adjustments that are long On form but short on substance. The SPLM on the other hand wants a permanent settlement that reshuffles, not the labels of administrative
structures and individuals in government, but the main frame of the system of governance. The relationship between the citizen and the state has to be re-covenanted in a manner that alleys the fears of all Groups. A new social contract has to be promulgated to regulate how citizens relate to each other on an equal basis. That is the only political dispensation that could justify the unity of Sudan.

It is clear that there is virtually no hope of reconciling the tensions of the SPLM with that of the regime in Khartoum. The IGAD peace process is frustrated by the very fact that the government in Khartoum never intended to negotiate a just settlement in the first place and the SPLMs refusal to throw in the towel. More importantly, the mediators and their partners in the West have not suggested how a negotiated settlement would be guaranteed if the parties made the necessary compromises. IGAD nevertheless remains a useful venue in case some
unexpected change occurs, as it often does, in politics.

END OF STEVE WONDU LECTURE;



 


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